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Abstract
Most countries have automatic rules in their tax-and-transfer systems that are
partly intended to stabilize economic fluctuations. This paper measures their effect on
the dynamics of the business cycle. We put forward a model that merges the stan-
dard incomplete-markets model of consumption and inequality with the new Keynesian
model of nominal rigidities and business cycles, and that includes most of the main
potential stabilizers in the U.S. data and the theoretical channels by which they may
work. We find that the conventional argument that stabilizing disposable income will
stabilize aggregate demand plays a negligible role in the dynamics of the business cy-
cle, whereas tax-and-transfer programs that affect inequality and social insurance can
have a larger effect on aggregate volatility. However, as currently designed, the set of
stabilizers in place in the U.S. has had little effect on the volatility of aggregate output
fluctuations or on their welfare costs despite stabilizing aggregate consumption. The
stabilizers have a more important role when monetary policy is constrained by the
zero lower bound, and they affect welfare significantly through the provision of social
insurance.
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1 Introduction
The fiscal stabilizers are the rules in law that make fiscal revenues and outlays relative to
total income change with the business cycle. They are large, estimated by the Congres-
sional Budget Office (2013) to account for $386 of the $1089 billion U.S. deficit in 2012,
and much research has been devoted to measuring them using either microsimulations (e.g.
Auerbach, 2009) or time-series aggregate regressions (e.g. Fedelino, Ivanova, and Horton,
2005). Unlike the controversial topic of discretionary fiscal stimulus, these built-in responses
of the tax-and-transfer system have been praised over time by many economists as well as
policy institutions.1 The IMF (Baunsgaard and Symansky, 2009; Spilimbergo, Symansky,
Blanchard, and Cottarelli, 2010) recommends that countries enhance the scope of these fiscal
tools as a way to reduce macroeconomic volatility. In spite of this enthusiasm. Blanchard
(2006) noted that: “very little work has been done on automatic stabilization [...] in the
last 20 years” and Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro (2010) argued that designing better
automatic stabilizers was one of the most promising routes for better macroeconomic policy.
This paper asks the question: are the automatic stabilizers effective at reducing the
volatility of macroeconomic fluctuations? More concretely, we propose a business-cycle model
that captures the most important channels through which the automatic stabilizers may
attenuate the business cycle, we calibrate it to U.S. data, and we use it to measure their
quantitative importance. Our first and main contribution is a set of estimates of how much
higher the volatility of aggregate activity would be if some or all of the fiscal stabilizers were
removed.
Our second contribution is to investigate the theoretical channels by which the stabi-
lizers may attenuate the business cycle and to quantify their relative importance. The
literature suggests four main channels. The dominant mechanism, present in almost all
policy discussions of the stabilizers, is the disposable income channel (Brown, 1955). If a
fiscal instrument, like an income tax, reduces the fluctuations in disposable income, it will
make consumption and investment more stable, thereby stabilizing aggregate demand. In
the presence of nominal rigidities, this will stabilize the business cycle. A second channel for
potential stabilization works through marginal incentives (Christiano, 1984). For example,
with a progressive personal income tax, the tax rate facing workers rises in booms and falls in
recessions, therefore encouraging intertemporal substitution of work effort away from booms
1See Auerbach (2009) and Feldstein (2009) in the context of the 2007-09 recession, and Auerbach (2003)
and Blinder (2006) more generally for contrasting views on the merit of countercyclical fiscal policy, but
agreement on the importance of automatic stabilizers.
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and into recessions. Third, automatic stabilizers have a redistribution channel. Blinder
(1975) argued that if those that receive funds have higher propensities to spend them than
those who give the funds, aggregate consumption and demand will rise with redistribution.
Oh and Reis (2012) argued that if the receivers are at a corner solution with respect to their
choice of hours to work, while the payers work more to offset their fall in income, aggregate
labor supply will rise with redistribution. Even if aggregate disposable income and marginal
tax rates were held constant, the distribution of this income can affect aggregate demand and
marginal incentives and thereby stabilize economic activity. Related is the social insurance
(or wealth distribution) channel: these policies alter the risks households face with conse-
quences for precautionary savings and the distribution of wealth (Floden, 2001; Alonso-Ortiz
and Rogerson, 2010; Challe and Ragot, 2015). For instance, a generous safety net will reduce
precautionary savings making it more likely that agents face liquidity constraints after an
aggregate shock.
Our third contribution is methodological. We merge the standard incomplete-markets
model surveyed in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2009) with the standard sticky-
price model of business cycles in Woodford (2003). Building on work by Reiter (2009),
we show how to numerically solve for the ergodic distribution of the endogenous aggregate
variables in a model where the distribution of wealth is a state variable and prices are
sticky. This allows us to compute second moments for the economy, and to investigate
counterfactuals in which some or all of the stabilizers are not present. We hope that future
work will build on this contribution to study the interaction between inequality, business
cycles and macroeconomic policy in the presence of nominal rigidities.
We find that our model is able to generate a large fraction of people with low wealth and
high marginal propensities to consume, as well as to mimic the variability and cyclicality of
the major macroeconomic aggregates and fiscal revenues and spending programs. While the
model can generate large multipliers in response to fiscal shocks, we find that the automatic
stabilizers have played a minor role in the business cycle. While the variability of aggregate
consumption is lower with the stabilizers, the variance of output or hours would actually fall
if the stabilizers were eliminated. The usual argument that automatic stabilizers operate
through the stabilization of aggregate demand is not borne out by our analysis.
At the same time, we find that the redistribution and social insurance channels are
powerful, so that programs that rely on them like food stamps can be effective at reducing
the volatility of aggregate output. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of the automatic stabilizers
depends on how monetary policy is conducted. If monetary policy is far from optimal, either
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due to bad policy or due to the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates binding, then
automatic stabilizers can play an important role in aggregate stabilization.
According to our model, scaling back the automatic stabilizers would result in a large drop
in a utilitarian measure of social welfare. However, this is mostly due to the redistribution
across different groups that these policies induce, and to the social insurance that they
provide. Business cycles do not play a large role in the welfare analysis. We do not calculate
optimal policy in our model, partly because this is computationally infeasible at this point,
and partly because that is not the spirit of our exercise. Our calculations are instead in the
tradition of Summers (1981) and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987). Like them, we propose a
model that fits the US data and then change the tax-and-transfer system within the model
to make positive counterfactual predictions on the business cycle.
Literature Review
This paper is part of a revival of interest in fiscal policy in macroeconomics.2 Most
of this literature has focussed on fiscal multipliers that measure the response of aggregate
variables to discretionary shocks to policy. Instead, we measure the effect of fiscal rules on
the ergodic variance of aggregate variables. This leads us to devote more attention to taxes
and government transfers, whereas the previous literature has tended to focus on government
purchases.3
Focussing on stabilizers, there is an older literature discussing their effectiveness (e.g.
Musgrave and Miller, 1948), but little work using modern intertemporal models. Christiano
(1984) and Cohen and Follette (2000) use a consumption-smoothing model, Gali (1994) uses a
simple RBC model, Andre´s and Dome´nech (2006) use a new Keynesian model, and Hairault,
Henin, and Portier (1997) use a few small-scale DSGEs. However, they typically consider the
effect of a single automatic stabilizer, the income tax, whereas we comprehensively evaluate
several of them to provide a quantitative assessment of the stabilizers as a group. Christiano
and Harrison (1999), Guo and Lansing (1998) and Dromel and Pintus (2008) ask whether
progressive income taxes change the region of determinacy of equilibrium, whereas we use
a model with a unique equilibrium, and focus on the impact of a wider set of stabilizers on
the volatility of endogenous variables at this equilibrium. Jones (2002) calculates the effect
2For a survey, see the symposium in the Journal of Economic Literature, with contributions by Parker
(2011), Ramey (2011) and Taylor (2011).
3In the United States in 2011, total government purchases were 2.7 trillion dollars. Government transfers
amounted to almost as much, at 2.5 trillion. Focussing on the cyclical components, during the 2007-09
recession, which saw the largest increase in total spending as a ratio of GDP since the Korean war, 3/4 of
that increase was in transfers spending (Oh and Reis, 2012), with the remaining 1/4 in government purchases.
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of estimated fiscal rules on the business cycle using a representative-agent model, whereas
we focus on the rules that make up for automatic stabilization and find that heterogeneity
is crucial to understand their effects. Finally, some work (van den Noord, 2000; Barrell
and Pina, 2004; Veld, Larch, and Vandeweyer, 2013) uses large macro simulation models
to conduct exercises in the same spirit as ours, but their models are often too complicated
to isolate the different channels of stabilization and they typically assume representative
agents, shutting off the redistribution and social insurance channels that we will find to be
important.
Huntley and Michelangeli (2011) and Kaplan and Violante (2014) are closer to us in
the use of optimizing models with heterogeneous agents to study fiscal policy. However,
they estimate multipliers to discretionary tax rebates, whereas we estimate the systematic
impact on the ergodic variance of the automatic features of the fiscal code. Heathcote
(2005) analyzes an economy that is hit by tax shocks and shows that aggregate consumption
responds more strongly when markets are incomplete due to the redistribution mechanism.
We study instead how the fiscal structure alters the response of the economy to non-fiscal
shocks. Floden (2001), Alonso-Ortiz and Rogerson (2010), Horvath and Nolan (2011), and
Berriel and Zilberman (2011) focus on the effects of tax and transfer programs on average
output, employment, and welfare in a steady state without aggregate shocks. Instead, we
focus on business-cycle volatility, so we have aggregate shocks and measure variances.
Methodologically, this paper is part of a recent literature using incomplete-market models
with nominal rigidities to study business-cycle questions. Oh and Reis (2012) and Guerrieri
and Lorenzoni (2011) were the first to incorporate nominal rigidities into the standard model
of incomplete markets. Both of them solved only for the impact of a one-time unexpected
aggregate shock, whereas we are able to solve for recurring aggregate dynamics. Gornemann,
Kuester, and Nakajima (2014) solve a similar problem to ours, but they focus on the dis-
tributional consequences of monetary policy. Ravn and Sterk (2013) use a related model to
analyze the interaction of market incompleteness, precautionary savings, aggregate demand,
and unemployment risks.
Empirically, Auerbach and Feenberg (2000), Auerbach (2009), and Dolls, Fuest, and
Peichl (2012) use micro-simulations of tax systems to estimate the changes in taxes that
follows a 1% increase in aggregate income. A much larger literature (e.g Fatas and Mihov,
2012) has measured automatic stabilizers using macro data, estimating which components
of revenue and spending are strongly correlated with the business cycle. Whereas this work
focusses on measuring the presence of stabilizers, our goal is instead to judge their effect on
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the business cycle.
2 A business-cycle model with automatic stabilizers
To quantitatively evaluate the role of automatic stabilizers, we would like to have a model
that satisfies three requirements.
First, the model must include the four channels of stabilization that we discussed. We
accomplish this by proposing a model that includes: (i) intertemporal substitution, so that
marginal incentives matter, (ii) nominal rigidities, so that aggregate demand plays a role
in fluctuations, (iii) liquidity constraints and unemployment, so that Ricardian equivalence
does not hold and there is heterogeneity in marginal propensities to consume and willingness
to work, and (iv) incomplete insurance markets and precautionary savings, so that social
insurance affects the response to aggregate shocks.
Second, we would like to have a model that is close to existing frameworks that are known
to capture the main features of the U.S. business cycle. With complete insurance markets,
our model is similar to the neoclassical-synthesis DSGE models used for business cycles, as
in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005), but augmented with a series of taxes and
transfers. With incomplete insurance markets, our model is similar to the one in Krusell and
Smith (1998), but including nominal rigidities and many taxes and transfers.
Third and finally, the model must include the main automatic stabilizers present in the
data. Table I provides an overview of the main components of spending and revenue in the
integrated U.S. government budget.4
The first category on the revenue side is the classic automatic stabilizer, the personal
income tax system. Because it is progressive in the United States, its revenue falls by more
than income during a recession. Moreover, it lowers the volatility of after-tax income, it
changes marginal returns from working over the cycle, it redistributes from high to low-
income households, and it provides insurance. Therefore, it works through all of the four
theoretical channels. We consider three more stabilizers on the revenue side: corporate
income taxes, property taxes and sales and excise taxes. All of them lower the volatility of
after tax income and so may potentially be stabilizing. Because they have, approximately,
a fixed statutory rate, we will refer to them as a group as proportional taxes.5
4Online Appendix C provides more details on how we define each category.
5Average effective corporate income tax rates are in fact countercyclical in the data, mostly as result of
recurrent changes in investment tax credits during recessions that are not automatic.
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TABLE I: The automatic stabilizers in the U.S. government budget (percent
of GDP)a
Revenues Outlays
Progressive income taxes Transfers
Personal income taxes 10.98 Unemployment benefits 0.33
Safety net programs 1.02
Proportional taxes Supplemental nutrition assistance 0.24
Corporate income taxes 2.57 Family assistance programs 0.24
Property taxes 2.79 Security income to the disabled 0.36
Sales and excise taxes 3.85 Others 0.19
Budget deficits Budget deficits
Public deficit 1.87 Government purchases 15.60
Net interest income 2.76
Out of the model Out of the model
Payroll taxes 6.26 Retirement-related transfers 7.13
Customs taxes 0.24 Health benefits (non-retirement) 1.56
Licenses, fines, fees 1.69 Others (esp. rest of the world) 1.85
Sum 30.25 Sum 30.25
a Average of each component of the budget as a ratio of GDP for the period 1988-2007.
On the spending side, we consider two stabilizers working through transfers. Unem-
ployment benefits greatly increase in every recession as the number of unemployed rises.
Safety-net programs include food stamps, cash assistance to the very poor, and transfers to
the disabled. During recessions, more households have incomes that qualify them for these
programs and the aggregate quantity of transfers increases.
Interacting with all the previous stabilizers is the budget deficit, or the automatic con-
straint imposed by the government budget constraint. This includes both how fast debt
is paid down as well as the fiscal tools used to reduce deficits. We will consider different
rules, especially with regards to how government purchases adjust. The convention in the
literature measuring automatic stabilizers is to exclude government purchases because there
is no automatic rule dictating their adjustment.6 We will consider both this case, as well
6See Perotti (2005) and Girouard and Andre´ (2005) for two of many examples. That literature distin-
guishes between the built-in stabilizers that respond automatically, by law, to current economic conditions,
and the feedback rule that captures the behavior of fiscal authorities in response to current and past infor-
mation.
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as an alternative where government purchases serve as a stabilizer by responding to budget
deficits.
The last rows of table I include the fiscal programs that we will exclude from our study
because they conflict with at least one of our desired model properties. Licenses and fines
have no obvious stabilization role. We leave out international flows so that we stay within
the standard closed-economy business-cycle model. More important in their size in the
budget, we omit retirement, both in its expenses and in the payroll taxes that finance it,
and we omit health benefits through Medicare and Medicaid. We exclude them for two
complementary reasons. First, so that we follow the convention, since the vast literature
on measuring automatic stabilizers to assess structural deficits almost never includes health
and retirement spending.7 Second, because conventional business-cycle models typically
ignore the life-cycle considerations that dominate choices of retirement and health spending.
The share of the government’s budget devoted to health and retirement spending has been
steadily increasing over the years so exploring possible effects of these types of spending on
the business cycle is a priority for future work.8
The model that follows is the simplest that we could write—and it is already quite
complicated—that satisfies these three requirements and includes all of these stabilizers. To
make the presentation easier, we will discuss several agents, so that we can introduce one
automatic stabilizer per type of agent, but most of them could be centralized into a single
household and a single firm without changing the equilibrium of the model.
2.1 Patient households and the personal income tax
We assume that the economy is populated by two groups of households. The first group is
relatively more patient and has access to a complete set of insurance markets in which they
can insure all idiosyncratic risks. This is not a strong assumption since these agents enjoy
significant wealth and would be close to self-insuring, even without state-contingent financial
assets. We can then talk of a representative patient household, whose preferences are:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log ct − ψ1 n
1+ψ2
t
1 + ψ2
,
]
(1)
7Even the increase in medical assistance to the poor during recessions is questionable: for instance, in
2007-09 the proportional increase in spending with Medicaid was as high as that with Medicare.
8We have experimented with simple ways of incorporating these parts of the government budget such as
including a payroll tax and treating the outlays on health care and retirement as government purchases. Our
results are little affected by these changes.
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where ct is consumption and nt are hours worked, both non-negative. The parameters β, ψ1
and ψ2 measure the discount factor, the relative willingness to work, and the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply, respectively. We assume that there is a unit mass of patient households.
The budget constraint of the representative patient households is
pˆtct + bt+1 − bt = pt [xt − τ¯x(xt) + T pt ] . (2)
The left-hand side has the uses of funds: consumption at the price pˆt, which includes con-
sumption taxes, plus saving in risk-less bonds bt in nominal units. The right-hand side has
after-tax income, where xt is the real pre-tax income, τ¯
x(xt) are personal income taxes, and
pt is the price of a unit of final goods. T
p
t refers to lump-sum transfers, which we will calibrate
to zero, but will be useful later to discuss counterfactuals.
The real income of the representative patient household is
xt = (It−1/pt)bt + dt + wts¯nt. (3)
It equals the the sum of the returns on bonds at nominal rate It−1, dividends dt from owning
firms, and wage income. The wage rate is the product of the average wage in the economy,
wt, and the agent’s productivity s¯. This productivity could be an average of the individual-
specific productivities of all patient households, since these idiosyncratic draws are perfectly
insured.
The patient households own two types of assets explicitly in the model. They trade
bonds with the impatient households and the government and they invest capital in the
production firms via a holding company that we discuss below. This capital investment is
financed by a negative dividend in their budget constraint. In addition, omitted from the
model to conserve on notation, the patient households trade Arrow-Debreu securities among
themselves to pool their idiosyncratic risks.9
The first automatic stabilizer in the model is the personal income tax system. It satisfies:
τ¯x(x) =
∫ x
0
τx(x′)dx′, (4)
where τx : R+ → [0, 1] is the marginal tax rate that varies with real income. The system is
progressive because τx(·) is weakly increasing.
9The securities that these households trade within themselves to insure against idiosyncratic risks net out
to zero and so disappear in the budget constraint of the representative patient household.
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2.2 Impatient households and transfers
There is a measure ν of impatient households indexed by i ∈ [0, ν], so that an individual vari-
able, say consumption, will be denoted by ct(i). They have the same period felicity function
as patient households, but they are more impatient: βˆ ≤ β. Following Krusell and Smith
(1998), having heterogeneous discount factors allows us to match the very skewed wealth
distribution that we observe in the data. We link this wealth inequality to participation in
financial markets to match the well-known fact that most U.S. households do not directly
own any equity (Mankiw and Zeldes, 1991). We assume that the impatient households do
not own shares in the firms or own the capital stock. However, their savings can be used to
finance capital accumulation by lending to the patient households through the bond market.
Individual impatient households choose consumption, hours of work, and bond holdings
{ct(i), nt(i), bt+1(i)} to maximize:
E0
∞∑
t=0
βˆt
[
log ct(i)− ψ1nt(i)
1+ψ2
1 + ψ2
]
. (5)
Also like patient households, impatient households can save using risk-free nominal bonds,
and pay personal income taxes, so their budget constraint is:
pˆtct(i) + bt+1(i)− bt(i) = pt
[
xt(i)− τ¯x(xt(i)) + T st,(i)
]
, (6)
together with a borrowing constraint, bt+1(i) ≥ 0. The lower bound equals the natural debt
limit if households cannot borrow against future government transfers.
Unlike patient households, impatient households face two sources of uninsurable idiosyn-
cratic risk: on their labor-force status, et(i), and on their skill, st(i). If a household is
employed, then et(i) = 2, and she can choose how many hours to work. While working, her
labor income is st(i)wtnt(i). The shocks st(i) captures shocks to the worker’s productivity.
They generate a cross-sectional distribution of labor income. With some probability, the
worker loses her job, in which case et(i) = 1 and labor income is zero. However, now the
household collects unemployment benefits T ut (i), which are taxable in the United States.
Once unemployed, the household can either find a job with some probability, or exhaust
her benefits and qualify for poverty benefits. This is the last state, and for lack of better
terms, we refer to their members as the needy or the long-term unemployed. If et(i) = 0,
labor income is zero but the household collects food stamps and other safety-net transfers,
T st (i), which are non-taxable. Households in this labor market state are less likely than the
9
unemployed to regain employment. The transition probabilities across labor force states are
exogenous, but time-varying.
Collecting all of these cases, the taxable real income of an impatient household is:
xt(i) =

It−1bt(i)
pt
+ wtst(i)nt(i) if employed;
It−1bt(i)
pt
+ T ut (i) if unemployed;
It−1bt(i)
pt
if needy.
(7)
There are two new automatic stabilizers at play in the impatient household problem. First,
the household can collect unemployment benefits, T ut (i) which equal:
T ut (i) = T¯
u min {st(i), s¯u} . (8)
Making the benefits depend on the current skill-level captures the link between unemploy-
ment benefits and previous earnings, and relies on the persistence of st(i) to achieve this.
As is approximately the case in the U.S. law, we keep this relation linear with slope T¯ u and
a maximum cap s¯u.
The second stabilizer is the safety-net payment T st (i) paid to needy households, which
equals:
T st (i) = T¯
s. (9)
We assume that these transfers are lump-sum, providing a minimum living standard. In the
data, transfers are means-tested, but in our model these families only receive interest income
from holding bonds and this is a small amount for most households. When we impose a
maximum income cap to be eligible for these benefits, we find that almost no household hits
this cap. For simplicity, we keep the transfer lump-sum.
2.3 Final goods’ producers and the sales tax
A competitive sector for final goods combines intermediate goods according to the production
function:
yt =
(∫ 1
0
yt(j)
1/µtdj
)µt
, (10)
where yt(j) is the input of the j
th intermediate input. There are shocks to the elasticity of
substitution across intermediates that generate exogenous movements in desired markups,
µt > 1.
10
The representative firm in this sector takes as given the final-goods pre-tax price pt, and
pays pt(j) for each of its inputs. Cost minimization together with zero profits imply that:
yt(j) =
(
pt(j)
pt
)µt/(1−µt)
yt, (11)
pt =
(∫ 1
0
pt(j)
1/(1−µt)dj
)1−µt
. (12)
Goods purchased for consumption are taxed at the rate τ c, so the after-tax price of con-
sumption goods is:
pˆt = (1 + τ
c)pt. (13)
This consumption tax is our next automatic stabilizer, as it makes actual consumption of
goods a fraction 1/(1 + τ c) of pre-tax spending on them.
2.4 Intermediate goods and corporate income taxes
There is a unit continuum of intermediate-goods monopolistic firms, each producing variety
j using a production function:
yt(j) = atkt(j)
α`t(j)
1−α, (14)
where at is productivity, kt(j) is capital used, and `t(j) is effective labor.
The labor market clearing condition is∫ 1
0
`t(j)dj =
∫ ν
0
st(i)nt(i)di+ s¯nt. (15)
The demand for labor on the left-hand side comes from the intermediate firms. The supply
on the right-hand side comes from employed households, adjusted for their productivity.
The firm maximizes after-tax nominal profits
dt(j) ≡
(
1− τ k) [pt(j)
pt
yt(j)− wt`t(j)− (υrt + δ) kt(j)− ξ
]
− (1− υ)rtkt(j), (16)
taking into account the demand function in equation (11). The firm’s costs are the wage bill
to workers, the rental of capital at rate rt plus depreciation of a share δ of the capital used,
and a fixed cost ξ. The parameter υ measures the share of capital expenses that can be
deducted from the corporate income tax. In the United States, dividends and capital gains
11
pay different taxes. While this distinction is important to understand the capital structure
of firms and the choice of retaining earnings, it is immaterial for the simple firms that we
just described.10
Intermediate firms set prices subject to nominal rigidities a la Calvo (1983) with prob-
ability of price revision θ. Since they are owned by the patient households, they use their
stochastic discount factor, λt,t+s, to choose price pt(j)
∗ at a revision date with the aim of
maximizing expected future profits:
Et
[ ∞∑
s=0
(1− θ)sλt,t+sdt+s(j)
]
subject to: pt+s(j) = pt(j)
∗. (17)
The new automatic stabilizer is the corporate income tax, which is a flat rate τ k.
2.5 Capital-goods firms and property income taxes
A representative firm owns the capital stock and rents it to the intermediate-goods firms,
taking rt as given. If kt denotes the capital held by this firm, then the market for capital
clears when:
kt =
∫ 1
0
kt(j)dj. (18)
This firm invests in new capital ∆kt+1 = kt+1−kt subject to adjustment costs to maximize
after-tax profits:
dkt = rtkt −∆kt+1 −
ζ
2
(
∆kt+1
kt
)2
kt − τ pvt. (19)
The value of this firm, which owns the capital stock, is then given by the recursion:
vt = d
k
t + Et (λt,t+1vt+1) .
The new automatic stabilizer, the property tax, is a fixed tax rate τ p that applies to the
value of the only property in the model, the capital stock. A few steps of algebra show the
10Another issue is the treatment of taxable losses (Devereux and Fuest, 2009). Because of carry-forward
and backward rules in the U.S. tax system, these should not have a large effect on the effective tax rate
faced by firms, although firms do not seem to claim most of these tax benefits. We were unable to find a
satisfactory way to include these considerations into our model without greatly complicating the analysis.
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conventional results from the q-theory of investment:
vt = qtkt, (20)
qt = 1 + ζ
(
∆kt+1
kt
)
. (21)
Because, from the second equation, the price of the capital stock is procyclical, so will
property values, making the property tax a potential automatic stabilizer.
Finally, note that total dividends sent to patient households, dt, come from every inter-
mediate firm and the capital-goods firm:
dt =
∫ 1
0
dit(j)dj + d
k
t . (22)
We do not include investment tax credits. They are small in the data and, when used to
attenuate the business cycle, they have been enacted as part of stimulus packages, not as
automatic rules.
2.6 The government budget and deficits
The government budget constraint is:
pt
[
τ c
(∫ ν
0
ct(i)di+ ct
)
+ τ pqtkt +
∫ ν
0
τ¯x(xt(i))di+ τ¯
x(xt)+
τ k
[∫ 1
0
dˆi(j)dj + (1− υ)rtkt
]
− ∫ ν
0
[T ut (i) + T
s
t (i)] di
]
= ptgt + It−1Bt +Bt −Bt+1 + ptT pt . (23)
On the left-hand side are all of the automatic stabilizers discussed so far: sales taxes, property
taxes and personal income taxes in the first line, and corporate income taxes and transfers
in the second line.11 On the right-hand side are government purchases, gt and government
bonds Bt. The market for bonds will clear when:
Bt =
∫ ν
0
bt(i)di+ bt. (24)
In steady state, the stabilizers on the left-hand side imply a positive surplus, which
is offset by steady-state government purchases g¯. Since we set transfers to the patient
households in the steady state to zero, T¯ p = 0, the budget constraint then determines a
11dˆi(j) are taxable profits, the term in brackets on the right-hand side of equation (16).
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steady state amount of debt B¯, which is consistent with the government not being able to
run a Ponzi scheme.
Outside of the steady state, as outlays rise and revenues fall during recessions, the left-
hand side of equation (23) decreases leading to an automatic increase in the budget deficit
during recessions. We study the stabilizing properties of deficits in terms how fast and with
what tool the debt is paid.
We assume that the lump-sum tax on the patient households and government purchases
adjust to close deficits because they are the fiscal tools that least interfere with the other
stabilizers. They do not affect marginal returns as do the distortionary tax rates, and they
do not have an important effect on the wealth and income distribution as do transfers to
impatient households. We assume simple linear rules similar to the ones estimated by Leeper,
Plante, and Traum (2010):
log(gt) = log(g¯)− γG log
(
Bt/pt
B¯
)
, (25)
T pt = T¯
p + γT log
(
Bt/pt
B¯
)
. (26)
The parameters γG, γT > 0 measure the speed at which the deficits from recessions are paid
over time. Large values of these parameters imply deficits are paid right away the following
period; if they are close to zero, they take arbitrarily long to get paid. Their relative size
determines the relative weight that purchases and taxes have on fiscal stabilizations.
2.7 Shocks and business cycles
In our baseline, monetary policy follows a simple Taylor rule:
It = I¯ + φ∆ log(pt)− εt, (27)
with φ > 1. We omitted the usual term in the output gap for two reasons. First, because
with incomplete markets, it is no longer clear how to define a constrained-welfare natural
level of output to which policy should respond. Second, because it is known that in this class
of models with complete markets, a Taylor rule with an output term is quantitatively close
to achieving the first best. We preferred to err on the side of having an inferior monetary
policy rule so as to raise the likelihood that fiscal policy may be effective. We will consider
alternative monetary policy rules in section 5.
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Three aggregate shocks hit the economy: technology, log(at), monetary policy, εt, and
markups, log(µt). Therefore, both aggregate-demand and aggregate-supply shocks may drive
business cycles, and fluctuations may be efficient or inefficient. We assume that all shocks
follow independent AR(1) processes for simplicity.12 It would be straightforward to include
trend growth in the model, but we leave it out since it plays no role in the analysis.
The idiosyncratic shocks to households, et(i) and st(i) are first-order Markov processes.
Moreover, the transition matrix of labor-force status, the three-by-three matrix Πt, depends
on a linear combination of the aggregate shocks. In this way, we let unemployment vary
with the business cycle to match Okun’s law.
2.8 Equilibrium
An equilibrium in this economy is a collection of aggregate quantities (yt, kt, dt, vt, ct, nt, bt+1, xt, d
k
t );
aggregate prices (pt, pˆt, wt, qt); impatient household decision rules (ct(b, s, e), nt(b, s, e)); a
distribution of households over assets, skill levels, and employment statuses; individual firm
variables (yt(j), pt(j), kt(j), lt(j), dt(j)); and government choices (Bt, It, gt) such that:
(i) patient households maximize (1) subject to the budget constraint (2)-(3),
(ii) the impatient household decision rules maximize (5) subject to (6)-(7),
(iii) the distribution of households over assets, skill, and employment levels evolves in a
manner consistent with the decision rules and the exogenous idiosyncratic shocks,
(iv) final-goods firms behave optimally according to equations (11)-(13),
(v) intermediate-goods firms maximize (17) subject to (11), (14), (16),
(vi) capital-goods firms maximize expression (19) so their value is given by (20)-(21),
(vii) fiscal policy respects (23) and (25)-(26) while monetary policy follows (27),
(viii) markets clear for labor in equation (15), for capital in equation (18), for dividends in
equation (22) and for bonds in equation (24).
Online Appendix D derives the optimality conditions that we use to solve the model. We
evaluate the mean and variance of aggregate endogenous variables in the ergodic distribution
of the equilibrium in this economy.
12We have also experimented with including investment-specific technology shocks and found similar re-
sults. More details are available from the authors.
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3 The positive properties of the model
The model just laid out combines the uninsurable idiosyncratic risk familiar from the liter-
ature on incomplete markets with the nominal rigidities commonly used in the literature on
business cycles. Our first contribution is to show how to solve this general class of models,
and to briefly discuss some of their properties.
3.1 Solution algorithm
Our full model is challenging to analyze because the solution method must keep track not
only of aggregate state variables, but also of the distribution of wealth across agents. One
candidate algorithm is the Krusell and Smith (1998) algorithm, which summarizes the dis-
tribution of wealth with a few moments of the distribution. We opt instead for the solution
algorithm developed by Reiter (2009), because this method can be easily applied to models
with a rich structure at the aggregate level, including a large number of aggregate state vari-
ables. Here we give an overview of the solution algorithm, while online Appendix E provides
more details.
The Reiter algorithm first approximates the distribution of wealth with a histogram that
has a large number of bins. The mass of households in each bin becomes a state variable of
the model. The algorithm then approximates the household decision rules with a discrete
approximation, a spline. In this way, the model is converted from one that has infinite-
dimensional objects to one that has a large, but finite, number of variables.
Using standard techniques, one can find the stationary competitive equilibrium of this
economy in which there is idiosyncratic uncertainty, but no aggregate shocks. Reiter (2009)
calls for linearizing the model with respect to aggregate states, and solving for the dynamics
of the economy as a perturbation around the stationary equilibrium without aggregate shocks
using existing linear rational expectations algorithms. The resulting solution is non-linear
with respect to the idiosyncratic variables, but linear with respect to the aggregate states.13
Approximation errors arise both because the projection method to solve the Euler equa-
tion involves some approximation error between grid points, and because of the linearization
with respect to aggregate states. To assess the accuracy of the solution, we compute Euler-
equation errors and report the results in online Appendix F.
13The method proposed by Reiter (2010) allows for a finer discretization of the distribution of wealth by
using techniques from linear systems theory to compress the state of the model. We have used this to verify
that our results are not affected by adopting a finer discretization of the distribution of wealth.
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3.2 Calibrating the model
We calibrate as many parameters as possible to the properties of the automatic stabilizers in
the data. For government spending and revenues our target data is in table I, which reflects
the period 1988-2007. For macroeconomic aggregates, we use quarterly data over a longer
period, 1960-2011, so that we can include more recessions in the sample and periods outside
the Great Moderation so as not to underestimate the amplitude of the business cycle.14
For the three proportional taxes, we use parameters related to preferences or technology
to match the tax base in the NIPA accounts, and choose the tax rate to match the average
revenue reported in table I, following the strategy of Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994). The
top panel of table II shows the parameter values and the respective targets.
For the personal income tax, we followed Auerbach and Feenberg (2000) and calculated
federal and state taxes for a typical household using TAXSIM. We averaged the tax rates
across states weighted by population, and across years between 1988 and 2007. We then fit
a cubic function of income to the resulting schedule, and splined it with a flat line above a
certain level of income so that the fitted function would be non-decreasing. The result is in
figure 1. The cubic-linear schedule approximates the actual taxes well, and its smoothness
is useful for the numerical analysis. We then added an intercept to this schedule to fit the
effective average tax rate. This way, we made sure we fitted both the progressivity of the
tax system (via TAXSIM) and the average tax rates (via the intercept).
Panel B calibrates the parameters related to government spending. Both parameters
governing transfer payments are set to match the average outlays from these programs,
while the cap on unemployment benefits uses an approximation of existing law.
Panel C contains parameters that relate to the distribution of income and wealth across
households. According to the Survey of Consumer Finances, 83.4% of the wealth is held by
the top 20% in the United States (Dı´az-Gime´nez, Glover, and R´ıos-Rull, 2011). We then
picked the discount factor of the impatient households to match this target.
Omitted from the table for brevity, but available in Appendix A, are the Markov tran-
sition matrices for skill level and employment. We used a 3-point grid for household skill
levels, which we constructed from data on wages in the Panel Study for Income Dynamics.
The transition matrix across employment status varies linearly with a weighted average of
the three aggregate shocks to match the correlation between employment and output. We set
14To ensure that the government’s budget balances in steady state we scale the outlays that we target in
our calibration up by 1.024 so that total revenues and outlays are equal in table I. For example, we calibrate
total safety net spending to be 1.04% of GDP as opposed to 1.02% as appears in table I.
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TABLE II: Calibration of the parameters
Symbol Parameter Value Target (Source)
Panel A. Tax bases and rates
τ c Tax rate on consumption 0.054 Avg. revenue from sales taxesa
β Discount factor of pat. households 0.989 Consumption-income ratio = 0.689b
τ p Tax rate on property 0.003 Avg. revenue from property taxesa
α Coefficient on labor in production 0.296 Capital income share = 0.36b
τ k Tax rate on corporate income 0.350 Statutory rate
υ Deduction of capital costs 0.680 Avg. revenue from corp. inc. taxa
ξ Fixed costs of production 0.575 Corporate profits / GDP = 0.091b
µ Desired gross markup 1.10 Avg. U.S. markupc
Panel B. Government outlays and debt
T¯ u Unemployment benefits 0.144 Avg. outlays on unemp. benefitsa
s¯u/T¯ u Max. UI benefit / avg. income 0.66 Typical state lawd
T¯ s Safety-net transfers 0.151 Avg. outlays on safety-net benefitsa
G/Y Steady-state purchases / output 0.145 Avg. outlays on purchasesa
γT Fiscal adjustment speed (tax) -1.60 St. dev. of deficit/GDP = 0.009b*
γG Fiscal adjustment speed (spending) -1.28 St. dev. of log spending = 0.013b*
B/Y Steady-state debt / output 1.70 Avg. interest expensesa
Panel C. Income and wealth distribution
ν Imp. households per pat. households 4
βˆ Discount factor of imp. households 0.979 Wealth of top 20% by wealthe
s¯ Skill level of pat. households 3.72 Income of top 20% by wealthe
Panel D. Business-cycle parameters: externally calibrated
θ Calvo price stickiness 0.286 Avg. price duration = 3.5f
ψ1 Labor supply 21.6 Avg. hours worked = 0.31
g
ψ2 Labor supply 2 Frisch elasticity = 1/2
h
δ Depreciation rate 0.011 Ann. deprec./ GDP = 0.046b
ρp Autocorrelation markup shock 0.85
Panel E. Business-cycle parameters: internally calibrated
ζ Adjustment costs for investment 6 St. dev. of I = 0.053b*
φp Interest-rate rule on inflation 1.55 St. dev. of inflation = 0.638
b
ρz Autocorrelation productivity shock 0.75 Autocorrel. of log GDP = 0.864
b*
σz St. dev. of productivity shock 0.003 St. dev. of log GDP = 0.015
b*
ρm Autocorrelation monetary shock 0.62 Largest AR for inflation = 0.85
i
σm St. dev. of monetary shock 0.004 Share of output var. = 0.25
σp St. dev. of markup shock 0.025 Share of output var. = 0.25
* Indicates HP filtered data using smoothing parameter 1600 for quarterly data. Sources: (a) Table I,
(b) NIPA, (c) Basu and Fernald (1997), (d) Department of Labor (2008), (e) Dı´az-Gime´nez, Glover,
and R´ıos-Rull (2011), (f) Klenow and Malin (2010), (g) Cooley and Prescott (1995), (h) Chetty
(2012), (i) Pivetta and Reis (2007).
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Figure 1: The personal income tax rate from TAXSIM
its parameters to match the flows in and out of the two main government transfer programs,
food stamps and unemployment benefits, both on average and over the business cycle.
Finally, Panels D and E have all the remaining parameters. Most are standard, but a
few deserve some explanation. First, the Frisch elasticity of labor supply plays an important
role in many intertemporal business-cycle models. Consistent with our focus on taxes and
spending, we use the value suggested in the recent survey by Chetty (2012) on the response
of hours worked to several tax and benefit changes. We have found that the results on the
impact of automatic stabilizers on business cycle volatilities are not very sensitive to this
parameter although the impact of taxes on the average level of activity is clearly sensitive
to the choice of labor supply elasticity. Second, we choose the variance of monetary shocks
and markup shocks so that a variance decomposition of output attributes them each 25% of
aggregate fluctuations. There is great uncertainty on the empirical estimates of the sources
of business cycles, but this number is not out of line with some of the estimates in the
literature. Our results turn out to not be sensitive to these choices.
Whereas the parameters in panel D are set directly to match the target moments, those in
panel E (together with βˆ and s¯ in panel C) are determined jointly in an internal calibration of
the model’s ergodic distribution, that estimates these 9 parameters to minimize the distance
19
Figure 2: Steady-state capital and household bond holdings
to the 9 target moments. While we have tried to use data to discipline our choices of
parameters as much as possible, there is nevertheless uncertainty surrounding many of the
values reported in table II. A formal estimation and characterization of this uncertainty is
beyond the scope of this study.
3.3 Optimal behavior and equilibrium inequality
Figure 2 uses a simple diagram to describe the stationary equilibrium of the model without
aggregate shocks. For the sake of clarity, the figure depicts an environment in which there
are no taxes that distort saving decisions.
The downward-sloping curve is the demand for capital, with slope determined by dimin-
ishing marginal returns. The supply of savings by patient households is perfectly elastic at
the inverse of their time-preference rate just as in the neoclassical growth model. Because
they are the sole holders of capital, the equilibrium capital stock in the model is determined
by the intersection of these two curves. Introducing taxes on capital income, like the per-
sonal or corporate income taxes, raises the pre-tax return on savings that patient households
require and lowers the equilibrium capital stock.
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Figure 3: Optimal savings policies
If impatient households were also fully insured, their supply of savings would be the
horizontal line at βˆ−1. But, because of the idiosyncratic risk they face, they have a pre-
cautionary saving motive. Therefore, they are willing to hold bonds at lower interest rates.
Their aggregate savings are given by the upward-sloping curve. Because in the steady state
without aggregate shocks, bonds and capital must yield the same return, equilibrium bond
holdings by impatient households are given by the point to the left of the equilibrium capital
stock. The difference between the total amount of government bonds outstanding and those
held by impatient households gives the bond holdings of patient households.
Figure 3 shows the optimal savings decisions of impatient households at each of the
employment states. When households are employed, they save, so the policy function is above
the 45o line. When they do not have a job, they run down their assets. As wealth reaches
zero, those out of a job consume all of their safety-net income, leading to the horizontal
segment along the horizontal axis in their savings policies.
Figure 4 shows the ergodic wealth distribution for impatient households. Two features
of these distributions will play a role in our results. First, many needy households hold
essentially no assets, so they live hand to mouth. Second, the figure shows a counterfactual
wealth distribution if the two transfer programs are significantly cut. Because not being
employed now leads to a larger loss of income, households save more, which raises their
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Figure 4: The (smoothed) ergodic wealth distribution (density)
wealth in all states. Table III shows the proportion of each skill-employment group that has
assets less than one quarter’s average income for an employed individual with the same skill
level.
3.4 Business cycles
Before we use this model to perform counterfactuals on the effect of the automatic stabilizers
on the business cycle, we inspect whether it can mimic the key features of U.S. business cycles.
TABLE III: Fraction of sub-population with low wealtha
Skill level (s)
Employment (e) Share of population Low Medium High
Employed 0.692 0.574 0.072 0.017
Unemployed 0.021 0.589 0.080 0.016
Needy 0.087 0.769 0.486 0.334
a Low wealth is defined as assets less than the average quarterly income
for an employed household with the same skill level.
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Figure 5 shows the impulse responses to the three aggregate shocks, with impulses equal
to one standard deviation. The model captures the positive co-movement of output, hours
and consumption, as well as the hump-shaped responses of hours to a TFP shock. Inflation
rises with expansionary monetary shocks, but falls with productivity and markup shocks.
As usual in the standard Calvo model, the responses are fairly short-lived. In spite of all
the heterogeneity, the aggregate responses to shocks are similar to those of the standard new
neoclassical-synthesis model in Woodford (2003) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005) that has been widely used to study business cycles in the past decade.
Turning to the unconditional moments of the business cycle, we chose the parameters of
our model so that it mimics the standard deviations of output, unemployment and inflation.
Therefore, the model already matches the unconditional second moments in these variables.
Also by calibration, the model already reproduces the main features of the wealth and income
distribution.
The marginal propensity to consume (MPC) has received a great deal of attention in the
study of fiscal policy and it also plays an important role in our model. All else equal, a larger
MPC would raise the strength of the disposable-income channel as any fluctuation in dispos-
able income would translate into a larger movement in aggregate demand. Moreover, with
more heterogeneous MPCs, the redistribution channel will be stronger as moving resources
from agents with higher to lower MPCs will have a larger impact on aggregate demand.
Table IV shows the distribution of MPCs in our economy according to employment status
and wealth percentile. Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland (2011) use tax rebates to
estimate an average MPC between 0.12 and 0.3. Our model is able to generate MPCs that
go from 0.02 to 0.49, so that both in the spread and on average, it has the potential to give
these two channels a strong role. Among the needy and the low-skill unemployed, the MPCs
are quite large and more individuals enter these groups in a recession. Comparing Tables III
and IV it is clear that the groups with high MPCs are those with few assets.
3.5 The effects and cyclicality of fiscal policy
Our calibration strategy targeted the average revenue generated from each tax. A test of
the model is whether it can also match the cyclicality of these revenues. Table V reports
the covariance of revenues and outlays with detrended output.15 For most spending and
15Detrending is important because the structure of the government budget has changed significantly across
decades, with some sources of revenue and spending growing fast and others declining. We use the HP filter
to calculate trend output, and divide both fiscal revenues and outlays by trend output before calculating the
covariance with detrended output. Because the cyclical component of GDP is stationary by construction,
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Figure 5: Impulse responses to the aggregate shocks
TABLE IV: Marginal propensity to consume
Wealth percentile
Skill group Employment 10th 25th 50th
Low Employed 0.097 0.079 0.077
Medium Employed 0.041 0.035 0.030
High Employed 0.030 0.026 0.024
Low Unemployed 0.473 0.339 0.212
Medium Unemployed 0.101 0.064 0.048
High Unemployed 0.057 0.043 0.034
Low Needy 0.479 0.479 0.478
Medium Needy 0.487 0.487 0.097
High Needy 0.492 0.130 0.067
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TABLE V: Covariance with detrended GDPa
Fiscal variable Data Model
Tax revenues 0.095 0.044
Sales tax 0.004 0.007
Property tax -0.002 0.003
Personal income tax 0.052 0.046
Corporate income tax 0.041 -0.013
Purchases -0.009 0.022
UI payments -0.020 -0.010
Net government savings 0.185 0.136
a Quarterly data from 1960:I - 2011:IV and expressed relative to po-
tential output (HP filter trend).
tax categories the model-predicted cyclicalities are not only of the right sign but also quite
close to their empirical counterparts. The main failure is that the model generates counter-
cyclical revenues for the corporate income tax while these are strongly pro-cyclical in the
data. The reason is that our model, like any new Keynesian model, has countercyclical
markups. Therefore, because corporate profits are strongly linked to markups, the revenue
from taxing corporate income is countercyclical in the model, even though it is procyclical
in the data. Overall, the discrepancy between the predicted and actual cyclicality in total
tax revenues is 0.051, which is almost entirely explained by the discrepancy in the cyclicality
of corporate income tax revenue (0.054).
A simple extension of the model can eliminate this gap with little change to its relevant
properties. If only a fraction of the fixed operating cost ξ is deductible from the corporate
income tax and this fraction is counter-cyclical, then we can exactly match the cyclicality of
the corporate income tax revenues. As the fixed cost is not a choice variable, its tax treatment
does not change marginal incentives, so the dynamics of the model barely change. Moreover,
we can partially defend this admittedly ad hoc assumption with the limited deductibility of
corporate income tax credits.
Figure 6 shows the impulse responses of output to shocks to three fiscal variables: an
increase in government purchases, a cut in the personal income tax, and a redistribution of
wealth from patient households to the needy. In the first two cases we change one parameter
of the model unexpectedly and only at date 1, and trace out the aggregate dynamics as the
by calculating the covariance, we are not letting the trends in fiscal items affect the estimates. Moreover, by
detrending all variables in the government budget constraint by the common output trend, the covariances
of all of the terms in equation 23 have to add up.
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Figure 6: Impulse response of output to three fiscal experiments
economy converges back to its old ergodic distribution. In the third case, we redistribute
wealth at date 1 and simulate the model starting from that new distribution towards the
ergodic case. In each case, we normalize the response of output by the size of the policy
change measured in terms of its impact on the government budget. The response to redis-
tribution is non-linear in the size of the transfer, which we set so that each needy household
receives one percent of average household income.
Because these shocks have no persistence, their aggregate effect will always be limited.
Yet, we find that they induce relatively large changes in output. Calculating multipliers
as the ratio of the change in output to the change in the deficit over the first year of the
experiment, we find reasonably-sized numbers: 0.90 for purchases, 0.27 for taxes, and 0.23
for redistribution. These are larger than the typical response in the neoclassical-synthesis
model. With household heterogeneity, the aggregate demand effects of these fiscal policies
are larger, since the MPC of the needy in particular are very high, and the aggregate supply
effect is larger as well, since the employed households bear more of the financing of fiscal
expansions, so they are particularly encouraged to work harder when marginal taxes fall or
their total after-tax wealth falls. Our model is therefore able to generate significant effects
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Figure 7: Response of output to fiscal experiments without wealth effect on labor supply
of fiscal policy.
Figure 7 shows the same responses when we modify the utility function to have no wealth
effects on labor supply as in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988). Qualitatively, the
responses of output are similar. Quantitatively, the impact of government purchases is larger,
since government purchases raise aggregate demand by more with these preferences, while the
impact of redistribution is smaller, since the employed households no longer choose to work
hard as a result of being taxed more heavily. This confirms our intuition on which economic
channels are at work in the model, and provides motivation to consider the quantitative
effect that this change will have on our estimates of the role of the stabilizers.
3.6 Two special cases
In the analysis that follows, we consider two special cases of our model as benchmarks that
help isolate different stabilization channels. First, with complete markets, households can
diversify idiosyncratic risks to their income. The following assumption eliminates these risks:
Assumption 1. All households trade a full set of Arrow securities, so they are fully insured,
and they are equally patient, βˆ = β.
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It will not come as a surprise that if this assumptions holds, there is a representative
agent in this economy. More interesting, the problem she solves is familiar:
Proposition 1. Under assumption 1, there is a representative agent with preferences:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
log(ct)− (1 + Et)ψ1 n
1+ψ2
t
1 + ψ2
}
,
and with the following constraints:
pˆtct + bt+1 − bt = pt [xt − τ¯(xt) + T nt ] ,
xt =
It−1
pt
bt + wtst(1 + Et)nt + dt + T
u
t ,
st =
[
1
1 + Et
s¯
1+1/ψ2
t +
Et
1 + Et
∫ ν
0
s
1+1/ψ2
i,t di
] 1
1+1/ψ2
,
where 1 +Et is total employment, including patient and impatient households and T
n
t is net
non-taxable transfers to the household.
The proof is in Appendix B. With the exception of the exogenous shocks to employment,
the problem of this representative agent is fairly standard. Moreover, on the firm side,
optimal behavior by the goods-producing firms leads to a new Keynesian Phillips curve, while
optimal behavior by the capital-goods firm produces a familiar IS equation. Therefore, with
complete markets, our model is of the standard neoclassical synthesis variety (Woodford,
2003) that has been intensively used to study business cycles over the past decade.
The complete-markets case is useful, not just because it is familiar, but also because it
allows us to study the effectiveness of automatic stabilizers when distributional issues are
set aside. In this version of the model, the marginal incentives and the disposable income
channels are the only two mechanisms at work.
A second special case that we will consider replaces the impatient household’s optimal
savings function with the assumption that all impatient households live hand-to-mouth.
That is, they consume all of their after-tax income at every date and hold zero bonds. This
can be seen as a limit when βˆ approaches zero. It is inspired by the savers-spenders model
of Mankiw (2000). In this case, a measure of 80% of all consumers behave as if they were at
the borrowing constraint, with an MPC of 1.
This benchmark is useful for several reasons. First, because it is close to the ultra-
Keynesian model in Gali, Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007) that combines hand-to-mouth
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behavior with nominal rigidities to be able to generate a positive multiplier of government
purchases on private consumption. For the study of fiscal policy, this is one of the closest
models to the IS-LM benchmark that is at the center of policy debates on fiscal policy. Sec-
ond, the assumption of hand-to-mouth behavior raises the marginal propensity to consume
by brute force.16 A large MPC, here literally equal to one for the impatient households,
maximizes the strength of the disposable income channel. Third, in the hand-to-mouth
model, there are no precautionary savings so the social insurance channel is shut off. Our
model potentially overstates the role of precautionary savings as households are infinitely
lived and therefore have plenty of time to accumulate assets. Compared to our full model,
the hand-to-mouth alternative is therefore useful to isolate the channels at work.
4 The effect of automatic stabilizers on the business
cycle
To assess whether automatic stabilizers alter the dynamics of the business cycle, we calculate
the fraction by which the variance of aggregate activity would increase if we removed some,
or all, of the automatic stabilizers. If V is the ergodic variance at the calibrated parameters,
and V ′ is the variance at the counterfactual with some of the stabilizers shut off, we define,
following Smyth (1966), the stabilization coefficient:
S =
V ′
V
− 1.
This differs from the measure of “built-in flexibility” introduced by Pechman (1973),
which equals the ratio of changes in taxes to changes in before-tax income, and is widely
used in the public finance literature.17 Whereas built-in flexibility measures whether there are
automatic stabilizers, our goal is instead to estimate whether they are effective at reducing
the volatility of aggregate quantities.
To best understand the difference, consider the following result, proven in Appendix B:
16Heathcote (2005) and Kaplan and Violante (2014) raise the MPC in a more elegant way by, respectively,
lowering the discount factor and introducing illiquid assets, but these are hard to accomplish in our model
while simultaneously keeping it tractable and able to fit the business-cycle facts and the wealth and income
distributions.
17See Dolls, Fuest, and Peichl (2012) for a recent example, and an attempt to go from built-in flexibility
to stabilization, by making the strong assumption that aggregate demand equals output and that poor
households have MPCs of 1 while rich households have MPCs of zero.
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Proposition 2. If assumption 1 holds, so there is a representative agent, and:
1. the Calvo probability of price adjustment θ = 1, so prices are flexible;
2. the personal income tax is proportional, so τx(·) is constant;
3. the probability of being employed is constant over time;
4. there are infinite adjustments costs, γ → +∞, and no depreciation, δ = 0, so capital
is fixed;
5. there are no fixed costs of production, ξ = 0;
then the variance of the log of output is equal to the variance of the log of productivity and
S = 0.
While this result and the assumptions supporting it are extreme, it serves a useful pur-
pose. While assumption 1 shuts off the redistribution and social insurance channels of
stabilization, the other assumptions in proposition 2 switch off the aggregate demand chan-
nel, since prices are flexible, and the marginal incentives channels, as households and firms
face the same marginal taxes in booms and recessions. The result in proposition 2 confirms
that, in the absence of these channels, the automatic stabilizers have no effect. Moreover,
note that the estimates of the size of the stabilizer following the Pechman (1973) approach
would be large in this economy. Yet, the stabilizers in this economy have no impact on the
volatility of log output and this is reflected by our version of the Smyth (1966) measure.
We begin by considering the roles of each of the stabilizers separately. In doing so,
we set γG = 0 in the fiscal rule so that we show the effect of changing the stabilizers as
cleanly as possible without changing the dynamics of government purchases due to the new
dynamics for government debt. Because the lump-sum taxes, which are the other means
for fiscal adjustment, are approximately neutral, they do not risk confusing the effects of
the stabilizers with their financing. We then conduct an experiment of reducing all of the
stabilizers at the same time to calculate the total effect of the automatic stabilizers on the
business cycle.
4.1 The effect of proportional taxes on the business cycle
Table VI considers the following experiment: we cut the tax rates τ c, τ p and τ k each by 10%,
and replaced the lost revenue of 0.6% of GDP by a lump-sum tax on the patient households.
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TABLE VI: The effect of proportional taxes on the business cyclea
Full model Representative agent Hand-to-mouth
variance average variance average variance average
output -0.0100 0.0117 -0.0019 0.0115 0.0105 0.0116
hours -0.0005 0.0004 0.0029 0.0015 0.0047 0.0006
consumption -0.0098 0.0093 -0.0182 0.0090 0.0400 0.0092
a Proportional change caused by cutting the stabilizer.
Lowering proportional taxes lowers the variance of the business cycle by a negligible
amount. In fact, removing the stabilizer, actually leads to a slightly more stable economy.
In the hand-to-mouth economy, as expected, consumption is less stable as the variance of
after-tax income is higher without the proportional taxes. But even then, the effect on the
variance of output is only 1%. At the same time, when these taxes are removed, output and
consumption are significantly higher on average in all economies.
Intuitively, a higher tax rate on consumption lowers the returns from working and so
lowers labor supply and output on average. However, because the tax rate is the same in
good and bad times, it does not induce any intertemporal substitution of hours worked, nor
does it change the share of disposable income available in booms versus recessions. Likewise,
the taxes on corporate income and property may discourage saving and affect the average
capital stock. But they do not do so differentially across different stages of the business cycle
and so they have a negligible effect on volatility.
Table VII instead cuts the intercept in the personal income tax by two percentage points.
The conclusions for the full model are similar. Again, no intertemporal trade-offs change
and lower taxes actually come with slightly less volatile business cycles. Section 4.3 discusses
the mechanism behind this fall in volatility.
4.2 The effect of transfers on the business cycle
To evaluate the impact of our two transfer programs, unemployment and poverty benefits,
we reduced spending on both by 0.6% of GDP, the same amount in the experiment on
proportional taxes. This is a uniform 80% reduction in the transfers amounts. Again, we
replaced the fall in outlays with a lump-sum transfer to the patient households. The results
are in table VIII. Transfers have a close-to-zero effect on the average level of output and
hours, yet they have a substantial effect on their volatility. Reducing transfer payments
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TABLE VII: The effect of the level of tax rates on the business cyclea
Full model Representative agent Hand-to-mouth
variance average variance average variance average
output -0.0051 0.0078 -0.0127 0.0076 -0.0600 0.0075
hours -0.0140 0.0036 -0.0090 0.0076 -0.0155 0.0034
consumption -0.0203 0.0089 -0.0142 0.0087 -0.0264 0.0086
a Proportional change caused by cutting the stabilizer.
raises output volatility by 6% and raises the variance of hours worked by as much as 9%.
Aside from the social-insurance channel, there is also a redistribution channel behind the
impact of transfers on aggregate volatility. In a recession, there are more households without
a job so more transfers in the aggregate. Transfers have no direct effect on the labor supply
of recipients as they do not have a job in the first place. However, they are funded by higher
taxes on the patient households, who raise their hours worked in response to the reduction
in their wealth. This stabilizes hours worked and output.
At the same time, without transfers, the volatility of aggregate consumption falls by
1%. To understand why, note that the transfers provide social insurance against a major
idiosyncratic shock that impatient households face. As households face more risk without
transfers, they accumulate more assets. This was visible in figure 4, with the large shift of the
wealth distribution to the right when transfers are reduced. With more savings, impatient
households are better able to smooth their consumption in response to fluctuations in income
caused by aggregate shocks and aggregate consumption becomes more stable.
The two special cases also confirm that redistribution and precautionary savings are
behind the effectiveness of transfers. In the representative-agent economy, both of these
channels are shut off, and the transfer experiment has a negligible effect on all variables. In
the hand-to-mouth economy, eliminating the public insurance provided by transfers raises
the volatility of aggregate consumption. This is as expected, since a large fraction of the
population does not smooth their consumption. Nonetheless, the volatility of output now
slightly falls without transfers. The hand-to-mouth economy maximizes the disposable-
income channel since every dollar given to impatient households is spent, raising output
because of sticky prices. Yet, we see that, quantitatively, this effect accounts for little of the
stabilizing effects of transfers in our economy.
This intuition also suggests that the effectiveness of transfers relies on a positive wealth
effect on labor supply. When we repeated the same experiment with preferences without
32
TABLE VIII: The effect of transfers on the business cyclea
Full model Representative agent Hand-to-mouth
variance average variance average variance average
output 0.0603 -0.0004 -0.0063 0.0002 -0.0083 -0.0042
hours 0.0944 -0.0098 -0.0037 0.0002 0.0047 -0.0017
consumption -0.0133 -0.0004 -0.0119 0.0002 0.1003 -0.0048
a Proportional change caused by cutting the stabilizer.
this wealth effect, the variance of output then increases by more, 11.4%, without the stabi-
lizers, while the variance of consumption now increases as well, by 6.6%, in contrast with
the results in table VIII. The intuition is as follows. Under standard preferences, households
use labor supply as a form of precautionary insurance. In a recession, the increase in un-
employment risk induces them to not only consume less but also to increase labor supply in
order to accumulate additional savings. With Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988)
preferences, the household responds to changes in risk only through consumption, not labor
supply. Therefore, consumption and aggregate demand must change by more, and transfers
become more effective.18
By taking the unemployment rate to be exogenous, our analysis does not incorporate the
impact of aggregate demand stabilization on the extent of idiosyncratic risk. This channel
has been studied extensively by Ravn and Sterk (2013). Conversely, by taking the unem-
ployment rate to be exogenous, our analysis does not incorporate the disincentive effect of
unemployment benefits on the incentive for unemployed workers to engage in costly search,
as in Young (2004), or for workers to accept lower wages when employed, as in Hagedorn,
Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman (2013).19
4.3 The effect of progressive income taxes on the business cycle
Our next experiment replaces the progressive personal income tax with a proportional, or
flat, tax that raises the same revenue in steady state. Table IX has the results.
Progressive income taxes have a modest effect on the volatility of output or hours, but
18The importance of wealth effects for the effectiveness of transfers has recently been emphasized by
Athreya, Owens, and Schwartzman (2014). Yet, there is no empirical consensus on how large this wealth
effect is.
19An earlier version of this paper considered an extension of the model that captures the disincentive
effects of transfers. Results are available from the authors upon request.
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TABLE IX: The effect of progressive taxes on the business cyclea
Full model Representative agent Hand-to-mouth
variance average variance average variance average
output 0.0023 0.0446 -0.0565 0.0383 -0.1484 0.0466
hours -0.0147 0.0388 -0.0189 0.0383 -0.0541 0.0316
consumption -0.0665 0.0507 -0.0013 0.0436 0.0167 0.0531
a Proportional change caused by cutting the stabilizer.
moving to a flat tax would raise the average level of economic activity significantly with
output and consumption increasing by 4%. This stands in contrast to our results for transfers,
even though both are redistributive policies. To understand this difference, we can consider
the four channels we discussed in the introduction.
First, because marginal tax rates rise with income this discourages labor supply and low-
ers average hours and investment leading to reduced average income. This well-understood
mechanism works in the cross-section, discouraging individual households from trying to
raise their individual income. However, the level of progressivity in the current U.S. tax sys-
tem is modest in the sense that the marginal tax rate function is relatively flat above median
income—recall figure 1. Therefore, the marginal tax rate that many employed households
face changes little between booms and recessions. This induces little substitution over time,
and therefore has a negligible effect on the variance.
On average activity, though, the effect is large. With a flat tax, because more tax
revenue is collected from households with less income, then the high-income households face
a significantly lower marginal tax rate. Therefore, they save more, the average capital stock
is higher, and so the impact of flattening the tax system on average income is large.
Second, the redistribution channel is significantly weaker than with transfers, because
it is less targeted. When the needy receive transfers they cannot reduce their labor supply
any further. In contrast, the personal income tax mostly redistributes among employed
households. The recipients lower their labor supply in response to their higher income, and
little stabilization results.
The important roles of redistribution and precautionary savings are again highlighted
by the two special cases, where these two channels are shut off. The table shows that in
either the representative-agent or the hand-to-mouth economies, a flat tax leads instead
to significantly less volatile business cycles. Further calculations, that we do not report
for brevity, show that this fall in volatility is in large part driven by the joint presence of
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TABLE X: The effect of all stabilizers on the business cyclea
Full model Representative agent Hand-to-mouth
variance average variance average variance average
output -0.0229 0.0567 -0.0756 0.0533 -0.1381 0.0557
hours -0.0296 0.0344 -0.0399 0.0429 -0.0432 0.0311
consumption 0.1232 0.0603 0.1833 0.0564 0.1938 0.0593
a Proportional change caused by cutting all stabilizers.
monetary policy shocks and sticky prices.
To understand what is going on, recall the basic mechanism for why a positive monetary
policy shock causes a boom with sticky prices: lower nominal interest rates lead to lower real
interest rates, which raises consumption, demand for output, and if prices do not change, then
raises hours worked and investment. Now, with a progressive tax, first the after-tax return on
saving faced by households, (1−τx(xt+1))It, is both lower as well as less sensitive to variations
in the nominal interest rate, which are driven by inflation. As a result, the progressive tax
makes the after-tax real interest rate respond less strongly to inflation. Second, with a
progressive tax, the increase in real income in a boom raises the marginal tax rate, which
lowers the after-tax real interest rate by even more. Therefore, progressive taxes lead to
lower real rates after positive monetary policy shocks, and thus more volatile responses of
output and hours. Part of this effect was evident in table VII where lower marginal tax rates
led to a more stable economy.
4.4 The effect of all stabilizers on the business cycle
We now combine all of the experiments above. In the counterfactual, a flat tax replaces the
progressive personal income tax, proportional taxes are cut by 10%, and unemployment and
poverty benefits are cut by 80%. Finally, we decrease the two fiscal adjustment coefficients
proportionately so that the variance of budget deficits falls by 10%. Altogether, we see this
as a feasible across-the-board reduction in the scope of the automatic stabilizers.
Table X shows the results of the overall experiment in our full model. The main result is in
the first two numbers in the table: the stabilizers have had a marginal effect on the volatility
of the U.S. business cycle in output or hours. Removing the stabilizers would significantly
raise the variance of aggregate consumption because government purchases would not be as
cyclical. Moreover, by lowering marginal tax rates, it would be a significantly richer economy
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TABLE XI: The role of the fiscal adjustment rulea
Baseline No spending No spending response Distortionary
response and balanced budget taxes adjust
output -0.0229 -0.0026 -0.0002 -0.1207
hours -0.0296 -0.0193 -0.0184 -0.0363
consumption 0.1232 -0.0361 -0.0318 0.1544
a Proportional change caused by cutting all stabilizers.
on average. Even though we found in the previous experiments that the safety-net transfers,
could be quite powerful at reducing the volatility of the business cycle, our results show that
the current mix of stabilizers actually increase the volatility of aggregate output and hours.
4.5 The role of debt financing
Both the persistence of budget deficits after recessions and the fiscal instrument used to pay
for them matter for the effect of any countercyclical fiscal policy, including the automatic
stabilizers. To study this role, we repeated the experiment of reducing all automatic stabiliz-
ers as in section 4.4, but with alternative assumptions about fiscal adjustment. The results
are shown in table XI.
First, we contrasted our baseline economy with an alternative economy where only the
lump-sum taxes adjust to close the deficits so γG = 0. In this economy, government purchases
are constant. The stabilizing effect of the automatic stabilizer on aggregate consumption now
disappears. In the baseline, the budget deficit in a recession leads to a reduction in purchases
that crowds in private consumption. With γG = 0, this no longer happens.
The third column of table XI shows the effect of not only setting γG to zero, but also of
raising γT to infinity so that the government balances its budget every period. The results
are almost identical to the previous experiment. While Ricardian equivalence does not hold
in our economy, changing the time profile of the taxes on patient households has a small
quantitative effect.
The third experiment replaces the rule for the adjustment lump-sum taxes in equation
(26), with a similar rule that adjusts the tax rates on the proportional taxes and the intercept
in the progressive tax system. We pick the speed of adjustment so that a given change in the
public debt generates the same revenue as in the baseline rule. The fourth column in table
XI shows a large destabilizing effect of the stabilizers under this rule. There are three reasons
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for why raising tax rates in a recession to pay for the debt contracts economic activity in
our model. First, the property and corporate income taxes rise discouraging investment.
Second, the sales tax rises, and is expected to fall when the economy recovers and the public
debt is paid, making households want to consume and work less in the recession. Third, the
personal income tax rises and is expected to fall in the future, discouraging labor supply.
As a result, now eliminating the stabilizers, and the need for these tax adjustments would
actually end up leading to less volatile fluctuations. Since government purchases still adjust,
the crowding-in effect on private consumption is still present.
To conclude, changing the timing of deficits per se has little effect on the economy. But
the way in which these deficits are financed can have a significant effect on volatility. In
particular, raising distortionary taxes in response to public deficits raises the volatility of
activity.
5 Monetary policy and automatic stabilizers
Our results show that the automatic stabilizers have overall little effect on the dynamics of
the business cycle. In particular, the usual arguments about the benefits of the stabilizers in
aggregate demand management are not supported by our findings. There are two ways we
could have arrived at this conclusion. One possibility is that the model might attribute little
importance to aggregate demand management in general. In this section we argue that this
is not the case. Instead, we argue that monetary policy comes close to reaching the first best
already so there is little additional role for fiscal policy. We then show that when monetary
policy is far from optimal, the automatic stabilizers have an important stabilizing effect.
5.1 The roles of price stickiness and monetary policy
Figure 5 already showed that shocks to monetary policy have a significant effect on output
in our economy. According to the model, a 25 basis point unexpected increase in interest
rates lowers output on impact by 0.3%. While the aggregate demand channel of fiscal policy
is weak, monetary policy still plays a significant role in the economy.
Table XII repeats the experiment of reducing all the stabilizers in our model under
different assumptions about monetary policy. First, a useful benchmark is the case where
prices are fully flexible, and it is shown in the second column of the table. This eliminates the
role of monetary policy entirely and neutralizes the aggregate demand channel. A common
finding in the representative-agent version of our business-cycle model without taxes and
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TABLE XII: The effect of all stabilizers with different monetary policiesa
Taylor rule
Flexible prices S.G.-U. Baseline Output Aggressive Accommodative
output -0.0428 -0.0430 -0.0229 -0.0333 -0.0339 0.1435
hours -0.0390 -0.0408 -0.0296 -0.0116 -0.0172 0.0891
consumption 0.1165 0.1256 0.1232 0.0905 0.0898 0.0016
inflation -0.4123 -0.2907 -0.2828 0.0822 0.0436 0.5201
a Proportional change caused by cutting the stabilizer.
transfers is that a finely-tuned monetary policy can come close to reaching the first best
(Woodford, 2003). We explore this in the third column of the table, which shows the same
experiment with sticky prices but now with a monetary policy rule that Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2007) showed is close to optimal in a version of the Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) model: log(It/It−1) = 0.77 log(It−1/It−2) + 0.75 log(pit−1) + 0.02 log(yt−1/yt−2).
This rule has the virtue of depending only on observables, so it avoids the difficulty of
defining the right concept of the output gap. The impact of the stabilizers is very similar to
the flexible-price case. This confirms the conjecture that with an effective monetary policy,
there is little room left for the automatic stabilizers to work through aggregate demand.
The last three columns of our table consider different versions of a Taylor rule that sets
the expected after-tax interest rate as a function of the current inflation rate20
Et [1− τx(xt+1)] It = I¯ + φp∆ log(pt) + φy∆ log(yt)− εt. (28)
Focusing monetary policy on the after-tax interest rate makes the analysis more transparent
because, as we explained at the end of section 4.3, the progressive income tax interacts
with the monetary policy rule to determine the effective response of real interest rates to
inflation.21 With this after-tax rule, the interpretation of φp is closer to the more familiar
case without taxes on interest income. Varying φp and φy lets us study the effect of more
aggressive responses of monetary policy to inflation, and of responding to output as well,
respectively.
The aggressive policy rule sets φp = 1.75 whereas our baseline has φp = 1.55, both with
φy = 0. The output policy rule has φp = 1.55 as in the baseline but now φy = 0.125. In all
20We use the expected tax-rate of the patient households in this rule.
21That a constant tax on interest income alters the effective monetary policy rule was previously noted
by Edge and Rudd (2007). In our model this effect is larger due to the progressivity of the tax system.
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three cases, the results are similar to the flexible price benchmark.
The accommodative policy rule sets φp = 1.03 so the after-tax real interest rate is quite
insensitive to changes in inflation. Under such a rule, demand shocks will lead to larger fluc-
tuations in activity as they are not offset by monetary policy. In contrast to the other cases,
here we find that the automatic stabilizers have an important role in stabilizing output and
hours. Under the accommodative policy, the stabilizers have little effect on the volatility of
aggregate consumption. This makes sense as the strong effect of the stabilizers on aggregate
consumption in the baseline arose out of changes in the dynamics of government purchases.
With an accommodative monetary policy, however, private consumption is insulated from
changes in the dynamics of government purchases.
To sum up, the rules that either approximate the U.S. data, or are optimal in a related
model, or are particularly aggressive, all seem to effectively manage aggregate demand leaving
little room for fiscal policy. But with the accommodative rule, the stabilizers substantially
reduce the volatility of aggregate output and hours.
5.2 Automatic stabilizers at the zero lower bound
One situation where monetary policy is very accommodative is when nominal interest rates
are at the zero lower bound (ZLB). At the same time, much recent research has shown that
fiscal policy can be particularly powerful when nominal interest rates do not respond to
inflation (Woodford, 2011), and that different fiscal instruments can have widely different
impacts relative to each other and to the case where the Taylor principle holds (Eggertsson,
2011). Given the often paradoxical results that the literature has found at the ZLB, it is not
clear how the role of the automatic stabilizers might change.
At the same time, it is not easy to solve our model when the ZLB binds. For one, most
algorithms rely on the ZLB being a current state that will never repeat itself in the future
(Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003), whereas our focus has been on the ergodic steady state.
Second, we have to solve the model non-linearly to capture the important precautionary
savings and social insurance channels, but non-linear solution algorithms for economies at the
ZLB are still in their infancy and cannot solve models as large as ours (Fernandez-Villaverde,
Gordon, Guerron, and Rubio-Ramirez, 2014). Third, hitting the ZLB and staying there for
more than one period is difficult in models with realistic capital adjustment costs, because
of the investment boom that comes with low interest rates (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo, 2011).
To solve these problems, we make the following simplifications. First, we set the capital
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adjustment cost to infinity so that the capital stock is fixed. Second, and related, we raise
the degree of price stickiness to θ = 0.15, still in line with some empirical estimates, because
this helps ensure the existence of a determinate equilibrium.22 Third, instead of the ergodic
distribution, we calculate a perfect foresight transition path starting from a stationary equi-
librium at date 0 where there are no aggregate shocks but households still face idiosyncratic
uncertainty. We found it necessary to make these simplifications in order to incorporate the
strong non-linearities at the ZLB, but this comes at a cost of eliminating investment and
aggregate uncertainty both of which could have important consequences for the quantitative
results.
At date 1, everyone learns that the rate of time preference of all households falls by 0.25%
for 15 periods, a standard shock in the ZLB literature.23 Moreover, at the same time, the risk
of becoming unemployed rises by 1.35% percentage points per quarter and the job-finding
rate of needy households falls by 0.89% for 8 quarters, so that we generate a cumulative drop
in employment of 4%, close to the peak-to-trough decline in employment during the U.S.
Great Recession. Online Appendix G explains in how we construct an equilibrium transition
path.
The solid lines in figure 8 show the dynamics of the nominal interest rate, output, ag-
gregate consumption and the total consumption of impatient households. The zero lower
bound binds for the first two periods of the transition before gradually returning to its steady
state value. Aggregate consumption drops by 6% percentage points on impact and output
by 4%. Impatient households are particularly affected by the deterioration in labor market
conditions so their consumption drops by nearly 10% on impact. The dashed lines in the
figure show the economy’s response to the same set of shocks when all stabilizers have been
reduced as in our baseline experiment. The impact of the shock is now substantially larger.
The ZLB binds for a further period, and consumption and output fall by an additional 2%
and 1%, respectively. With the reduction of social insurance, impatient households are hurt
even more, and their consumption falls by an additional 5% for a total fall of 15%.
These results suggest that the automatic stabilizers are more effective in mitigating the
extent of the contraction during a zero lower bound episode. This finding is consistent
with other studies of the power of fiscal policy at the zero lower bound (e.g. Christiano,
22We verified that the results in the paper so far do not change much with this new value for θ. Increasing
price stickiness helps dampen the explosive dynamics of inflation at the zero lower bound by having fewer
firms update their prices and by making current inflation depend more heavily on future inflation and less
on current marginal costs.
23Specifically, the discount factors β and βˆ both rise by a factor of 1.0025.
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Figure 8: The zero lower bound episode with and without automatic stabilizers
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Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2011).
6 The welfare effects of automatic stabilizers
The automatic stabilizers affect welfare partly due to their impact on the amplitude of the
business cycle that we have focused on so far. At the same time, they also affect welfare
by changing the average level of activity or the extent of public insurance that they provide
against idiosyncratic risks. This section discusses these different effects on welfare to answer
whether the stabilizers are desirable from a welfare perspective.
6.1 The overall welfare consequences of automatic stabilizers
Table XIII shows the change in the welfare of different agents in our economy from reducing
all the stabilizers as in the experiment in section 4.4. In this calculation we consider taking a
household with their current individual state variables from the economy with stabilizers and
placing them into the economy without stabilizers. We take both economies to be at their
respective steady states but the welfare of the agents reflects the anticipation of fluctuations
going forward. In the table, an entry of −0.10 indicates that a household has lower welfare
without the stabilizers by an amount equivalent to 10% of consumption.
As shown in the table, all impatient households are worse off in the world without sta-
bilizers. The equally-weighted average welfare loss in the table is -0.151. The welfare of the
patient households, in contrast, increases by 0.136. The stabilizers have a large redistributive
component, so a policy of scaling down transfers and moving to a flat tax benefits the rich
patient households and hurts the poor impatient households. Across impatient households,
it is also clear that the policy change has large redistributive effects. The low-wealth needy
lose particularly large amounts as they are entirely reliant on transfers for their current con-
sumption. These disparate effects make it hard to state whether the stabilizers are beneficial
or not. One controversial answer is to take a utilitarian social welfare function that weighs
each group by their population: in this case cutting the stabilizers lowers average welfare by
0.080 consumption-equivalent units.
The numbers in the table compare ergodic distributions. However, one of the reasons why
average output in the economy is higher without stabilizers is that households face higher
risk and raise their precautionary savings. These come at the expense of lower consumption
in the transition, so ignoring this transition may lead to an under-estimate of the welfare
benefits of the stabilizers. Yet, when we calculated the welfare of agents from the moment of
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TABLE XIII: Welfare cost to impatient households of reducing au-
tomatic stabilizersa
Wealth percentile
Employment Skill 10 25 50 75 90
Employed Low -0.174 -0.173 -0.173 -0.167 -0.156
Employed Medium -0.139 -0.136 -0.133 -0.127 -0.123
Employed High -0.101 -0.099 -0.097 -0.096 -0.096
Unemployed Low -0.253 -0.244 -0.240 -0.217 -0.190
Unemployed Medium -0.200 -0.185 -0.172 -0.155 -0.144
Unemployed High -0.142 -0.131 -0.123 -0.118 -0.116
Needy Low -0.371 -0.371 -0.371 -0.336 -0.266
Needy Med. -0.354 -0.354 -0.282 -0.230 -0.194
Needy High -0.334 -0.271 -0.198 -0.166 -0.152
a Welfare expressed in the proportional change caused in consumption equivalent of
cutting all stabilizers.
the policy change onwards, we found that the welfare estimates are only slightly lower than
in table XIII.
The welfare changes in the table are large for two complementary reasons. First, because
the stabilizers are providing social insurance, which the uninsured impatient households
benefit from. Second, because the stabilizers change the average level of post-tax income
among different types of households, redistributing resources even in the absence of shocks.
6.2 Isolating the impact of recessions
Another difficulty with assessing the effect of the stabilizers in welfare is that most of their
benefits have little to do with the business cycle. Social insurance may be desirable and
useful, regardless of whether it leads to business cycles that are more, less, or similarly
volatile. To investigate this, we now look at the effect of the stabilizers during a recession.
In particular, we compute the welfare cost of a series of recessions with and without the
stabilizers. We consider four recessionary episodes: a two standard deviation drop in TFP,
a two standard deviation contractionary monetary policy shock, a two standard deviation
inflationary markup shock, and the zero lower bound episode described in section 5.2. For
each, we compute a perfect foresight transition for 250 quarters and the utility of agents at
the moment the shock is realized. We then compare this utility to the case without shocks
in which the economy will remain at the steady state. This gives us the welfare cost of these
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TABLE XIV: Utilitarian cost of recessions
Shock Cost with stabilizers Cost without stabilizers Difference
Technology -0.00092 -0.00365 -0.00272
Monetary policy -0.00227 -0.00258 -0.00031
Markups -0.00206 -0.00363 -0.00157
Zero Lower Bound -0.02964 -0.03554 -0.00590
recessions. Table XIV shows the results.
With any of the shocks that we consider for our baseline model, the cost of business
cycles is small. As noted by Lucas (1987), this is a general feature of business cycle models,
and ours is no different. The exception is the ZLB, where the costs are close to 3% of
consumption.
More interesting, without the stabilizers, there is a large increase in the welfare cost
of the recessions in relative terms. Without stabilizers, the extra risk of ending up in the
needy state during a recession epsido can be quite costly to the impatient agents, who in
anticipation have lower expected welfare. However, comparing the results from table XIV
to the welfare consequences in table XIII, we see that the large welfare costs of eliminating
the stabilizers were not due to business cycles. From the narrow business-cycle perspective
of this paper, the stabilizers play a large role on how costly business cycles are. But, overall,
these are not very costly to start with, so the benefit is small. Rather, the large welfare
benefits of the stabilizers are due to redistribution and social insurance, not business-cycle
fluctuations.
7 Conclusions and future work
Milton Friedman (1948) famously railed against the use of discretionary policy to stabilize the
business cycle. He defended the power instead of fiscal automatic stabilizers as a preferred
tool for countercyclical policy. More recently, Solow (2005) strongly argued that policy and
research should focus more on automatic stabilizers as a route through which fiscal policy
could and should affect the business cycle.
We constructed a business-cycle model with many of the stabilizers and calibrated it to
replicate the U.S. data. The model has some interesting features in its own right. First, it
nests both the standard incomplete markets model, as well as the standard new-Keynesian
business cycle model. Second, it matches the first and second moments of U.S. business
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cycles, as well as the broad features of the U.S. wealth and income distributions. Third,
solving it requires using new methods that may be useful for other models that combine
nominal rigidities and incomplete markets.
We found that lowering taxes on sales, property, and corporate and personal income, or
reducing the progressivity of the personal income tax, did not have a significant impact on
the volatility of the business cycle. Moreover, lowering these taxes raised average output. At
the same time, higher transfers to the unemployed and poor were quite effective at lowering
the volatility of aggregate output.
In terms of the channels of stabilization, we found that the traditional disposable-income
channel used to support automatic stabilizers is quantitatively weak. Considerably more
important was the role of precautionary savings and social insurance. Moreover, both because
of the role of precautionary savings and because of the changes in government purchases to
pay for public debt, the stabilizers can at the same time stabilize aggregate consumption,
while destabilizing aggregate output.
Overall, we found that reducing the scope of all the stabilizers would have had little
impact on the volatility of the U.S. business cycle in the last decades. This depends on
monetary policy having responded aggressively to inflation and being close to optimal. When
monetary policy is far from optimal, the automatic stabilizers play a useful role in reducing
the magnitude of the business cycle, and during the recent episode with the zero lower
bound, they may have significantly reduced the depth of the recession. Nearly all of the
welfare impact of reducing the stabilizers comes from the social insurance they provide, and
not from their impact on the business cycle.
Aside from monetary policy, labor market institutions and policies also likely matter
for our results. In our model, we assume that transitions across employment states are
exogenous, but this ignores the disincentive effects of transfers to those without a job on
engaging in costly job search (e.g. Young, 2004) or in accepting lower wage offers (e.g.
Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, and Mitman, 2013). We have explored this in a version of
the model where the probability of finding a job depended on search effort, which in turn
lowered leisure of unemployed households. As expected, stabilizers were even less effective,
and more consistently destabilizing, as the increase in transfers to the unemployed during
a recession lowers their search effort and prolongs the recession.24 Finally, Ravn and Sterk
(2013) highlight an alternative interaction coming from labor demand, as unemployment risk
leads to to precautionary savings, which lowers aggregate demand, reduces hiring, and so
24All of these experiments are available from the authors, or are in the working paper version of this paper.
45
causes more unemployment risk. Like us, they find that aggressive monetary is very effective
at dealing with this channel. Considering these and other interactions between the stabilizers
and labor supply and demand seems a fruitful area for more research.
Another area for future work is the optimal design of stabilizers. Before doing so, we
had to understand the positive predictions of the model regarding the stabilizers, a task that
occupies this whole paper. Future work can take up the challenge of optimal policy design.
Being able to do this work in a quantitative model like the one in this paper will have to
overcome some challenging computational hurdles.
Finally, each of the automatic stabilizers that we considered is more complex than our
description and distorts behavior in more ways than the ones we modeled. Here we have
sought to incorporate the most important channels through which the stabilizers could work
while omitting other features of the economy in order to keep the model tractable. To obtain
sharper quantitative estimate of the role of the stabilizers, it would be desirable to include
the findings from the rich micro literatures that study each of these government programs
in isolation. Perhaps the main point of this paper is that to assess automatic stabilizers
requires having a fully articulated business-cycle model, so that we can move beyond the
disposable-income channel, and consider other channels as well as quantify their relevance.
Our hope is that as computational constraints diminish, we can keep this macroeconomic
approach of solving for general equilibrium, while being able to consider the richness of the
micro data.
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Appendix
A Calibration of the idiosyncratic shock processes
Each household at every date has a draw of st(i) determining the wage they receive if they
are employed, and a draw of et(i) on their employment status. This section describes how
we calibrate the distribution and dynamics of these two random variables.
A.1 Skill shocks
We use PSID data on wages to calibrate the skill process. To do this, we start with sample
C from Heathcote, Perri, and Violante (2010) and work with the log wages of household
heads in years 1968 to 2002. Computational considerations limit us to three skill levels and
we construct a grid by splitting the sample into three groups at the 33rd and 67th percentiles
and then using the median wage in each group as the three grid points, which results in skill
levels of 0.50, 0.92, and 1.64.25 Skills are proportional to the level (not log) of these wages.
Computational considerations also lead us to choose a skill transition matrix with as few
non-zero elements as possible. We impose the structure1− p p 0p 1− 2p p
0 p 1− p
 ,
where p is a parameter that we calibrate as follows. From the PSID data, we compute the
first, second and fourth auto-covariances of log wages. Let Γi be the i
th auto-covariance.
We use the moments Γ2/Γ1 and
√
Γ4/Γ2, each of which can be viewed as an estimate of the
autoregressive parameter if the log wages follow an AR(1) process.26 The empirical moments
are 0.9356 and 0.9496, respectively. To map these moments into a value of p, we minimize
the equally-weighted sum of squared deviations between these empirical moments and those
implied by the three-state Markov chain. As our time period is one quarter, while the PSID
data are annual, we use Γ8/Γ1 and
√
Γ16/Γ8 from the model. This procedure results in a
value of p of 0.015.
25The overall scale of skills is normalized so that average income in the economy is equal to one.
26The ratio Γ1/Γ0 is not used as this ratio is heavily influenced by measurement error, which leads to an
underestimate of the persistence of wages. The moments that we use are also used by Heathcote, Storesletten,
and Violante (2010) to estimate the persistence of the wage process.
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A.2 Employment shocks
Steady state In addition to differences in skill levels, households differ in their employment
status. A household can be (1) employed (E), (2) unemployed (U) or (3) needy (N). To
construct a steady state transition matrix between these three states we need six moments.
First, it is reasonable to assume that a household does not transit directly from employed
to long-term unemployed or from long-term unemployed back to unemployed. Those two
elements of the transition matrix are therefore set to zero.
The distribution of households across states gives us two more moments. As the focus of
our work is on the level and fluctuation in the number of individuals receiving different types
of transfers, we define unemployed as individuals who are receiving unemployment benefits
and needy as those receiving food stamps.
In the U.S., the Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program is the largest non-health,
non-retirement social safety net program. SNAP assists low-income households in being able
to purchase a minimally adequate low-cost diet. Recipients of these benefits are generally
not working.27 One virtue of using SNAP participation as a proxy for long-term unemploy-
ment is that it avoids the subtle distinction between unemployment and non-participation
in the Current Population Survey while still focussing on those individuals who likely have
poor labor market prospects. If we instead used time since last employment to identify
those in long-term unemployment, we would include a number of individuals with decent
opportunities to work if they chose to do so such as individuals who have retired or who
choose to work in the home. Between 1971, when the data begin, and 2011, the average
insured unemployment rate was 2.9%.28 Between 1974, when the SNAP program was fully
implemented nationwide, and 2011, the average ratio of SNAP participation to the insured
labor force was 8.7%. We refer to this as the SNAP ratio.29
Our final two moments speak to the flows across labor market states. We calibrate the
flow into unemployment using the ratio of initial claims for unemployment insurance to the
stock of employed persons covered by unemployment insurance. Between 1971 and 2011,
the average value of this ratio was 5.16%. Many spells of unemployment insurance receipt
are short and such spells are an important component of the data on flows.30 In our model,
27In 2009, 71% of SNAP recipient households had no earned income and only 17% had elderly individuals
(Leftin, Gothro, and Eslami, 2010).
28The insured unemployment rate is the ratio of the number of individuals receiving unemployment insur-
ance benefits to the number of employed workers covered by unemployment insurance.
29This ratio is calculated as the number of SNAP participants divided by the sum of the number of workers
covered by unemployment insurance and the number of individuals receiving UI benefits.
30In a typical quarter, the number of people who file an initial claim for UI is greater than the stock of
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the minimum unemployment spell length is one quarter so we take care to account for the
short spells in the data as part of our calibration strategy. We imagine that when a worker
separates from their job, they immediately join the pool of job seekers and can immedi-
ately regain employment without an intervening (quarter-long) period of unemployment. To
identify the probability of immediate reemployment, we assume it is the same as the job
finding probability of other unemployed workers. In addition, we calibrate the probabil-
ity of transitioning from long-term unemployment to employment based on the finding of
Mabli, Tordella, Castner, Godfrey, and Foran (2011) that 3% of SNAP participants leave
the program each month.
Our procedure is as follows: we use the moments above to create a target transition
matrix across employment states that our model should generate. This transition matrix
has the form:
E
U
N
 1− s1(1− f2) s1(1− f2) 0f2 (1− f2)(1− s2) (1− f2)s2
f3 0 1− f3

where element (i, j) is the probability of moving from state i to state j. There are four
parameters here s1, s2, f2, f3, which we set as follows: f3 = 0.0873, equivalent to 3% per
month; s1 = 0.0516 is the ratio of initial claims to covered employment; f2 = 0.540 and
s2 = 0.577 are chosen so the invariant distribution of the Markov chain matches the average
shares of the population in each state.
Business-cycle dynamics of employment risk An important component of our model
is the evolution of labor market conditions over the business cycle. One effect of the fluc-
tuations in labor market conditions is to alter the number of households receiving different
types of benefits over the cycle. A second effect is to alter the amount of risk that households
face, which has consequences for the consumption and work decisions.
As we analyze the aggregate dynamics of the model with a linear approximation around
the stationary equilibrium, it is sufficient to specify how the labor market risk evolves in the
neighborhood of the stationary equilibrium. Let Πt be the matrix of transition probabilities
between employment states at date t and t + 1. We impose the following structure on the
evolution of Πt
Πt = Π
0 + Π1 [χ1 log zt − χ2εt − (1− χ1 − χ2)µt] ,
where Π0 and Π1 are constant 3 × 3 matrices. Π0 is the matrix of transition probabilities
recipients at a point in time.
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between employment states in steady state. The term in brackets is a composite of the
technology and labor market shocks and the parameter χ1 and χ2 control how much the labor
market is driven by the three aggregate shocks. We set χ1 and χ2 so that the technology
shocks account for 50% of the variance of the unemployment rate in keeping with the view
that they drive 50% of the variance of output and the other two shocks each explain 25% of
the variance of unemployment.
What remains is to specify the matrix Π1.31 We use a Π1 that has two non-zero, off-
diagonal elements that allow the probability of losing employment to be counter-cyclical
and allow the probability of moving from long-term unemployment to employment to be
procyclical. We limit ourselves to these two parameters so as to economize on the number
of parameters that must be calibrated. We choose these two elements of Π1 to match the
standard deviations of the insured unemployment rate and the SNAP ratio defined above.
The standard deviation of the insured unemployment rate is 0.00937 and the standard
deviation of the SNAP ratio is 0.0205. These procedures leave us with the following:
Π0 =
0.9694 0.0306 00.5398 0.1948 0.2654
0.0873 0 0.9127
 , Π1 =
2.81 −2.81 00 0 0
2.33 0 −2.33
 ,
where the the (i, j) element of the Π matrices refers to the transition probability from state
i to state j and the states are ordered as employed, unemployed, long-term unemployed. In
addition, we have χ1 = 0.64, and χ2 = 0.32.
B Proofs for propositions
Proof of proposition 1. Before turning to the full proof, we highlight the intuition for the
result. With flexible prices, there is an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function, so if
the capital stock and employment are fixed, then the proposition will be true as long as the
labor supply is fixed. Equating the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and
leisure for households to their after-tax wage gives the standard labor supply condition:
nt(i) =
(
(1− τx)st(i)wt
ψ1ct(i)(1 + τ c)
)1/ψ2
31The rows of Π1 must sum to zero so that the rows of Πt always sum to one.
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Perfect insurance implies that consumption is equated across households. But then, our
balanced-growth preferences and technologies imply that ct/wt is fixed over time, so the
condition above, once aggregated over all households, gives a constant labor supply.
The full proof goes as follows. Under complete markets, the households will fully insure
idiosyncratic risks. Therefore, we treat them as a large family that pools risks among its
members. In determining the family’s tax bracket, we assume the tax collector applies the
tax rate corresponding to the average income of its members.
The large family maximizes
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
[
ln(ct)− ψ1 n
1+ψ2
t
1 + ψ2
+
∫ ν
0
ln ct(i)− ψ1nt(i)
1+ψ2
1 + ψ2
di
]
subject to
pˆt
[∫ ν
0
ct(i)di+ ct
]
+ bt+1 − bt = pt [xt − τ¯x(xt)] + Tt,
where Tt is net non-taxable transfers to the household and
xt = (It−1/pt)bt + wts¯nt + dt +
∫ ν
0
st(i)nt(i) + T
u
t (i)di.
The household also faces the constraint nt(i) = 0 if et(i) 6= 2. Let m1t be the Lagrange
multiplier on the former constraint and m2t be the Lagrange multiplier on the latter. Then
the first order conditions of this problem are
βt
ct
= pˆtm
1
t ct
βt
ct(i)
= pˆtm
1
t nt(i)
m1t = Et
{
m1t+1 +m
2
t+1(It/pt)
}
bt+1
m1tpt [1− τx(xt)] = m2t xt
βtψ1n
ψ2
t = m
2
twts¯ nt
βtψ1nt(i)
ψ2 = m2twtst(i) nt(i)
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These first order conditions can be rearranged to obtain
ct(i) = ct,
1
ct
= βEt
{
1 + It [1− τx(xt+1)]
ct+1pit+1
}
,
and aggregate labor input satisfies
s¯nt +
∫ ν
0
st(i)nt(i)di =
{
1
ψ1
1
ct
1− τx(xt)
1 + τ c
wt
}1/ψ2 [
s¯1+1/ψ2 + Et
∫ ν
0
(st(i))
1+1/ψ2 di
]
,
where Et is defined as the mass of impatient households who are employed. In this final step
we should only integrate over those households that are not at a corner solution, but this is
trivial as the marginal disutility of labor goes to zero as nt(i) goes to zero so all households
with positive wages are employed and it is only those who exogenously lack employment
opportunities who will set nt(i) = 0.
Proceeding similarly for the representative agent decision problem stated in the propo-
sition and defining aggregate labor input in that case to be (1 + Et)stnt, one reaches the
conclusion that the two models will deliver the same Euler equation and condition for aggre-
gate labor supply. Therefore, the two models will generate the same aggregate dynamics.
Proof of proposition 2. Under assumption 1, we can use the representative agent formulation
from proposition 1. The labor supply condition for this problem is
nt =
[
(1− τx)wtst
ct(1 + τ c)ψ1
]1/ψ2
,
where τx is the (constant) marginal tax rate. Under the conditions of assumption 2, the
aggregate resource constraint is: ct + gt = yt. But, since there is a constant ratio of gt to yt,
the resource constraint implies that ct/yt is constant and equal to 1 − g¯/y¯. Moreover, with
flexible prices, we can write wt =
(1−α)yt
µLt
, where Lt is aggregate labor input. Using these two
results to substitute out ct and wt we obtain
nt =
[
(1− τx)(1− α)yt
(1− g¯/y¯)yt(1 + τ c)ψ1µnt(1 + E)
]1/ψ2
,
where we have used the fact that the aggregate labor input is ntst(1+E), where employment
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is constant by assumption. Using this expression, we can solve for nt as
n
1+1/ψ2
t =
[
(1− τx)(1− α)
(1− g¯/y¯)(1 + τ c)ψ1µ(1 + E)
]1/ψ2
.
Because the right-hand-side does not depend on time, it follows that nt is constant over time.
Next, recall that capital is fixed and prices are flexible, so aggregate output is
yt = atK
α [(1 + E)sn]1−α ,
where K and n are the constant inputs of capital and hours, 1+E is total employment and s
is the skill level of the representative agent, which is also constant over time by the fact that
the labor market risk is unchanging over time so the composition of the pool of workers is
stable. It follows from this equation that the variance of log output is equal to the variance
of log productivity, at.
That S = 0 follows from the fact that the productivity process is exogenous and therefore
not affected by the presence or absence of automatic stabilizers. Notice that S = 0 holds
regardless of whether one uses output or consumption as the measure of activity as ct/yt is
constant. For hours, the ratio is not defined since there is no variation in hours worked.
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